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| Israel’s Change of Face, Not Yet of Course | |
Asad Mirza
Israel’s election has handed Gadi Eisenkot an opening, not a government. His effort to replace Benjamin Netanyahu depends on whether Arab parties can help build a parliamentary majority—and whether Jewish-led parties will accept that support. The stakes reach beyond coalition arithmetic: regional war, Israel’s democratic legitimacy, Washington’s stance and a consequential arms relationship with India.
President Isaac Herzog has tasked Eisenkot, the former Israeli military chief and leader of the Yashar party, with forming a government. It is a significant setback for Netanyahu, but not his removal: the incumbent remains caretaker prime minister while coalition negotiations unfold.
A mandate is not a majority
Eisenkot has 28 days, with a possible 14-day extension, to assemble a government that can win the Knesset’s confidence. The election produced no clear winner, and neither man’s bloc secured a majority. Herzog’s decision reflects recommendations from factions representing 67 lawmakers for Eisenkot, compared with 46 for Netanyahu - not a ready-made governing coalition.
That distinction matters. Israel’s political contest is no longer simply a referendum on Netanyahu. It is a test of whether parties that disagree on security, religion and the state’s treatment of Arab citizens can cooperate long enough to govern. Eisenkot has promised an “emergency” government and appealed to Likud members, while resisting a return to government under Netanyahu. A broad Jewish-party unity arrangement remains possible in principle, but the leaders’ differences - including over ultra-Orthodox military-service exemptions and accountability for the security failures around October 7 - are substantial.
The region should expect continuity before change
Eisenkot’s rise may change the tone of Israeli government more readily than its underlying security posture. A former chief of staff, he is not an outsider promising to dismantle the country’s military doctrine. He has said Hamas must be destroyed, and his appeal to voters rests partly on the claim that he can lead more responsibly than Netanyahu. For Palestinians and Israel’s neighbours, therefore, the new political moment is not itself evidence of a diplomatic breakthrough or a change in the conduct of war.
Still, leadership and coalition composition matter. Netanyahu’s outgoing government relied on far-right and ultra-Orthodox parties; Eisenkot is seeking a more moderate coalition. If he succeeds, the shift could reduce the influence of hardliners and create more room for pragmatic decisions. But a coalition assembled from ideologically disparate partners may be fragile, and Arab parties’ leverage could be constrained by the very conditions imposed to secure their support. The region should watch not only who becomes prime minister, but what the coalition agrees to do on Gaza, Iran, the Palestinians and Arab citizens of Israel.
The Arab partnership: a call made in the streets
The possibility of Jewish-Arab political cooperation was not invented in the coalition rooms. On November 1, thousands rallied in Israel urging Eisenkot to strike an agreement with Arab parties to remove Netanyahu. Their demand made a political fact visible: Arab citizens are not a peripheral constituency when their votes can determine who governs. After record turnout and historic gains by Arab-led parties, they may become kingmakers -though a formal Arab party’s place in a governing coalition remains exceptional in Israeli history.
The obstacle is more than arithmetic. Eisenkot initially said he would not partner with Arab-led parties; he has since indicated conditional willingness. He wants them to denounce Hamas as a terrorist organisation, while the parties have condemned Hamas’s actions but stopped short of that designation. Some Jewish parties in his prospective bloc may reject even a limited arrangement. One compromise would be external parliamentary support: Arab lawmakers could help sustain a minority government without joining its cabinet. That might make a government possible, but it could also leave Arab partners with less influence over policy and deepen the perception that their votes are welcome only when politically useful.
Netanyahu has tried to make such cooperation politically toxic, alleging that Arab parties threaten national security and describing them as supporters of terrorism. The claims, as reported, have not been substantiated. The language does more than attack a rival coalition: it questions the legitimacy of elected Arab lawmakers and the voters who sent them to parliament. A partnership would therefore be a practical test of equal citizenship, not merely a tactical arrangement. Yet, it would be a test with limits: participation in a coalition does not automatically bring agreement on Palestinian rights or an end to military conflict.
Trump’s comparison and Eisenkot’s constraint
Donald Trump has described Eisenkot and Netanyahu as “very similar” in their policies and views, while calling the contest between them unresolved. The comparison is useful partly because it challenges the idea that an Eisenkot government would represent a wholesale strategic reversal. Reportedly, Eisenkot has differentiated himself more clearly on governing style than on substantive policy. Trump’s remarks may reassure those who expect continuity in Israel’s alignment with Washington; they may also expose how little policy detail Eisenkot has offered to distinguish himself from the prime minister he seeks to replace.
Eisenkot’s own political constraint is therefore central. He has to persuade voters that he can govern differently without appearing to weaken Israel’s security, and persuade coalition partners that compromise will not cost them their defining positions. His military background may help him claim credibility on security, but it does not resolve the political choices around Gaza, accountability, military service or the role of Arab parties. A leader cannot simply invoke “national interests” as though they are self-evident: deciding whose security, whose rights and whose costs count is itself the substance of politics.
Trump’s framing could make it harder for Eisenkot to claim a sharp break with Netanyahu, especially if the new prime minister needs American backing on security. At the same time, it leaves Eisenkot room to argue that continuity on core national interests can coexist with a different style of government and a broader domestic coalition. Whether that distinction persuades Israelis will depend on decisions, not labels.
India: strategic ties outlast a change of government
For India, an Eisenkot government would be unlikely to erase the strategic logic behind the arms relationship. India has been Israel’s leading defence customer: SIPRI figures cited in reporting put its share at 34% of Israeli arms sales in 2020-24, while Israel’s defence ministry put sales to India during that period at about $20.5 billion. The relationship increasingly combines purchases with joint production and local manufacturing under India’s “Make in India” policy. Reported deals and proposals span air defence, drones and precision weapons, though some headline estimates remain expectations rather than confirmed contracts.
That partnership is also politically exposed. Amnesty identified 2,596 shipments of weapons, ammunition, parts and components from India to Israel between October 2023 and November 2025, based on trade records. It said the data do not establish the end user in every case or prove that each item went directly to the Israeli military. Nonetheless, the findings intensify scrutiny of the trade and the responsibilities of both governments and companies.
A new Israeli prime minister could face greater pressure to explain how arms transfers and military cooperation align with international obligations, particularly if the war and Israel’s diplomatic isolation remain defining issues. But India’s interests - defence technology, domestic production and strategic autonomy - will also shape policy in New Delhi. The likeliest near-term outcome is not a rupture but a relationship under closer political examination. If Eisenkot forms a government, its composition may alter Israel’s public posture; contracts, industrial ties and security needs will be harder to unwind.
The opening, then, is real but narrow. Eisenkot has the mandate, not yet the votes. A Jewish-Arab partnership could reshape who is treated as a legitimate participant in Israeli politics, but only if it gives Arab lawmakers more than symbolic value. And if the new prime minister’s policies prove close to Netanyahu’s, as Trump suggests, the decisive difference may lie less in grand strategy than in coalition choices, accountability and the boundaries Israel sets on power.
(Asad Mirza is a New Delhi-based senior commentator on national, international, defence and strategic affairs, environmental issues, an interfaith practitioner, and a media consultant.)
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